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A. J. Thomas, Jr.*
I. CHOICE OF LAW
Most Significant Contacts. The awaited decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas in the case of Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.! was handed down
in May 1968. The majority of the court denied the applicability of the
most significant contacts theory on these facts.! The action was one for
wrongful death of several persons. All the deceased were residents of
Texas but one who was a resident of Illinois. The negligent pilot and the
defendant aviation company were also residents of Texas. The plane was
returning to Texas on an interstate business journey when, after a refuel-
ing stop in Denver, it crashed in southeastern Colorado. Plaintiffs con-
tended that Colorado had no legally significant contacts with the parties
or the transaction; therefore, the wrongful death statute of the place of
injury, Colorado, which limited damages to $25,000 for each wrongful
death, should not be applicable. It was urged that the really significant
contacts were with Texas, that Texas was the center of gravity, and,
therefore, that the Texas forum should apply the Texas wrongful death
statute which placed no limit on the amount of recovery.
Following the traditional conflict of laws rule that the law of place of
injury governs the application of wrongful death statutes,' the court
rejected the new significant contacts approach. It reasoned that to apply the
Texas wrongful death statute4 would give the statute extraterritorial
effect. The court cited the 1884 Texas case of Willis v. Missouri Pacific
Railway' which limited the enforcement of a right of action created solely
by statute to the state where the statute exists and where the injury
occurred. It was also explained that article 4678,' adopted several years
subsequent to the wrongful death statute, had as its expressly stated object,
the allowance of a right of action under the law of another state for the
wrongful death of a Texas citizen and application of such law in a Texas
court; and it by no means signified extraterritorial effect for the Texas
wrongful death statute. It was concluded that the legislature did not
intend the Texas wrongful death statute to have extraterritorial force,
and that Texas courts had borne this out in their opinions. Therefore,
* B.S., Agricultural and Mechanical College of Texas; LL.B., The University of Texas; LL.M.,
S.J.D., University of Michigan. Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
'430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
2 This short survey of the case cannot be concerned with explanation of the significant contacts
rule in the conflict of laws or with a discussion of its merits as compared with the older vested
rights rule of the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws. For leading cases on the significant con-
tacts or relationship doctrine, see Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240
N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963); Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. Ii, 1968).
'RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 391 (1934).
4 TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. arts. 4671, 4672 (1952).
561 Tex. 432 (1884).
'TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
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since stare decisis was said to have its greatest force in an area of statutory
construction, any change would have to come through the legislature.!
A strong dissent urged that the Willis decision should be overruled for
it had been discredited by later federal opinions which would permit a
state having substantial contacts with a cause of action constitutionally to
apply its own law to determine the outcome of the case even though the
occurrence, for example the injury, might have taken place within the
territorial bounds of another state. Quoted was the following statement
of the Supreme Court of the United States in Richards v. United States:
Where more than one State has sufficient substantial contact with the activity
in question, the forum State, by analysis of the interests possessed by the
States involved, could constitutionally apply to the decision of the case the
law of one or another state having such an interest in the multistate activity!
The dissenting opinion further reasoned that article 4671 did not by
words limit its application to wrongful death occurring within the state;
that it would not be logical to assume that the legislature intended to
prohibit Texas citizens from recovery under the Texas Act simply because
the injury occurred elsewhere; and that failure by the legislature to extend
the application of the Texas Act could not be considered as acquiescence
to a non-extraterritorial application in view of the fact that the judiciary
in the Willis case and other cases had held that such extension could not
constitutionally be made, a notion now changed by the Supreme Court
of the United States.
Taking up article 4678 the dissent stated that this provision did not
require application of the law of the place of injury; it merely authorized
such application. With these points in mind the dissent believed the
significant contacts doctrine could be adopted so as to permit the applica-
tion of the Texas wrongful death statute where all of the important and
vital operative facts of the case were related to Texas except the occurrence
of the crash which caused the injury and death.
One might query the effect of this decision on the acceptance of the
most significant contacts choice of law rule by Texas courts. Does the
majority opinion signify complete and continued adherence to the old
vested rights doctrine (i.e., the law of the place of injury governs unless
against the public policy of the forum') with its rigid emphasis upon a
one and only proper jurisdictional factor? Such a conclusion would be
doubtful, for the court emphasized both in the opinion and on motion for
rehearing that adoption of the significant contacts doctrine, which was
admitted to have merit, was impossible in this case because the legislature
and Texas courts had declared the wrongful death statute to be without
extraterritorial effect and that, as noted above, when the construction of a
statute was involved, stare decisis is most strong. Modification of a common
law rule by the courts would present a different situation for it was pointed
7430 S.W.2d at 187.
8369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962).
'On the vested rights theory as applicable to tort, and wrongful death actions, public policy
and choice of law, see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 377, 378, 391, 612 (1934).
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out that the common law "was the special domain of the courts."'"
The doctrine of lex loci delicti is a court-made rule. . . . [A]nd the abandon-
ment of this rule in favor of some different one, such as a 'significant contacts'
rule, while it may involve the overruling of common law precedents on policy
grounds, does not necessarily involve saying that a statute had one meaning
fifty years ago and a different one today."
Consequently, it might be concluded that the Texas Supreme Court
will adopt the significant contacts rule in choice of law cases when it
involves changing a common law choice of law rule or even when a statu-
tory rule is not considered as being as clear or as having congealed to such
a degree as to set forth a contrary intention of the legislative body.
The significant contacts theory was again involved in the civil appeals
case of Brown v. Seltzer." Here the court was presented with a choice of
applying the Texas Guest Statute or that of the state of New York. The
defendant-operator and the deceased-passenger were travelling through
Texas on an automobile sightseeing trip which apparently started in New
York with a contemplated destination in Mexico, but ended in a collision
with a Texas signpost. A suit for damages was brought by parents of the
deceased against the operator of the automobile, which was owned by the
operator's mother. The parties were all resident-domiciliaries of states
other than Texas, the plaintiff-parents and their son being domiciliaries
of California and the defendant-operator being domiciled in New York.
The trial court applied the Texas Guest Satute which prohibits a cause
of action for damages to a guest against an owner or operator of a motor
vehicle in case of accident on the public highways of the state unless the
accident was intentional on the part of the owner or operator or caused by
his gross negligence. On appeal contention was made that the trial court
should have applied the law of New York so as to permit proof of simple
negligence of the operator rather than the stricter gross negligence require-
ment of Texas. New York, it was claimed, had the most significant rela-
tionship to the transaction and the parties, hence, its law should govern.
The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. It rejected
the most significant contacts doctrine as the Texas rule, and cited the case
of Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc.3 as decided by the Austin court of
civil appeals. The Supreme Court of Texas had not yet handed down its
opinion affirming that of the court of civil appeals in the Marmon case,1
but the court in Brown, noting that the supreme court had granted writ
of error in the Marmon case and apparently somewhat uneasy that the
supreme court might adopt the contacts principle, rationalized that the
effect of the cases applying the significant contacts doctrine in tort or
wrongful death actions" was merely to authorize a forum to apply its
10430 S.W.2d at 186.
"I Id. at 194.
"2424 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
" 416 S.W.2d 58 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error granted.
14 Marmon v. Mustang Aviation, Inc., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968). See text accompanying
notes 1-10 for discussion of this case.
15See, e.g., Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963);
Griffith v. United Air Lines, Inc., 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964).
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own law or public policy when application of the laws of the place of
injury would be against the forum's public policy. The court concluded
that in the case at hand, since Texas was the place of injury (in the court's
words the place where the cause of action accrued) and since Texas was
also the forum, no conflict of laws problem was involved because the
forum simply applied its own law to a cause of action accruing within
the state of the forum.
This view is correct only under the vested rights theory. Adoption of a
significant contacts theory would, however, present a changed picture so
that a choice of law problem by the forum would exist. Thus, under the
new proposed official draft of the Second Restatement of Conflicts, which
adopts "significant contacts," although the law of the place of injury and
the public policy of the forum are very important and the former will or-
dinarily be applicable to determine the rights of the parties in a death ac-
tion, this is true only when no other state has a more significant relation-
ship to the transaction and the parties. In this event, the law of the state
having the most significant contacts is to be applied. Contacts for consider-
ation would include not only place of injury and occurrence of conduct,
but also domicile of the parties and the place where the relationship be-
tween the parties may be centered." The center of relationship considera-
tion has much significance with respect to a duty owed a guest passenger
in an automobile, particularly if accompanied by other contacts such as
domicile of the parties. A case for the centering of the relationship in
New York in Brown would be weak. It would be much stronger if all the
parties had been domiciled there and if the trip had not only commenced
there but was also to end there." Texas as the place of conduct and in-
jury probably was the jurisdiction having the most significant contacts
with the transaction.
Statutes of Limitations, Characterization. Article 4678 of the Texas
statutes9 was also the subject of conflicts controversy in the civil appeals
case of Francis v. Herrin Transportation Co.,19 in which application for
writ of error has been granted by the Supreme Court of Texas. This was
a damage suit brought by a widow for the injury and death of her husband
in Louisiana by reason of defendant's negligence. The suit was barred in
Louisiana by its one-year limitation period for wrongful death, but not by
the longer Texas limitations period of two years. The trial court dismissed
the plaintiff's action, holding that the Louisiana statute governed and
therefore destroyed the cause of action. Upon appeal the trial court's
judgment was affirmed.
Traditionally, statutes of limitation have been treated as procedural
because the passage of time has been thought to destroy only the legal
remedy, not the right or the cause of action." As a procedural matter, the
10 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 1, 45, 138 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II,
1968). §'ld.  145, at 14-15.
"S TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952).
19423 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error granted.
"
0 For discussion, sw G. STUMBERC, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 145-46 (3d ed. 1963).
[Vol. 23
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forum's law would govern. Thus, if the suit on an extrastate action is
barred by the limitation period of the forum even though it is not barred
by the statute of the state under which law it arose, no action can be main-
tained. Conversely, as in the case at hand, if the cause is not barred by the
forum, but is barred by the place where it arose, the cause of action can
be maintained at the forum. Following this line of thought the decision
here would appear to be out of line, but for a well-settled exception to the
general rule: an action cannot be maintained in a forum state if it is
barred by a statute of limitations of the state whose law would otherwise
govern if that statute bars the right, not just the remedy."5 Decisions have
taken the position that where a statute creates the right and in the same
enactment sets forth the time limitation for the bringing of an action, such
limitation bars the right. Consequently, suit cannot be brought under the
longer period of the forum if the time has elapsed under the statute of the
place." Since, as the court points out, Louisiana is the place where the
cause arose, and, since the Louisiana statute creating the wrongful death
action contains within it a built-in limitations period, the Louisiana limi-
tation period governs.
Nothing seems amiss with the decision under conflict of laws principles,
but Texas article 4678 is somewhat troublesome. This statute authorizes
redress in Texas courts for injury or death where the wrongful act, neglect
or default occurred in another state if "a right to maintain and recover
damages" is given by the statute or law of such state. However, article
4678 further provides that the action must be brought within the time
prescribed for the commencement of such actions by the statutes of Texas
and that the law of the forum governs in matters of procedure. On its
face this provision would seemingly permit recovery through an applica-
tion of the Texas limitation period. The court reasoned, however, that
article 4678 was inapplicable since it requires a right to maintain an action
under foreign law; there was no right in Louisiana because of its extin-
guishment or destruction by the passage of time which was substantive in
nature. Only if a right did exist under foreign law would application of
the Texas limitation period ever become pertinent.
A final point of interest in the Francis case is the fact that the court
characterized the Louisiana statute as substantive in the light of adjudi-
cated cases in Louisiana. ' Traditionally, most characterization problems in
conflict of laws in the United States have been resolved by reference to
the doctrinal concepts of the forum. But some cases 4 and writers"' have,
21 Id. at 147-48; RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 604 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 143 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I, 1967).
" The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886); California v. Copus, 158 Tex. 196, 309 S.W.2d
227 (1918).
2" This involves what has been called a question of secondary characterization, i.e., the making
of a decision as to the nature of a statute of a foreign state as being procedural or substantive. On
the problem of characterization, see McClintock, Distinguishing Substance and Procedure in the Con-
flict of Laws, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1930); Robertson, A Survey of the Characterization Prob-
lem in the Conflict of Laws, 52 HARv. L. REV. 747 (1939); 31 MINN. L. REV. 492 (1947).
24See, e.g., Anderson v. State Farm Mlut. Auto. Ins. Co., 222 Minn. 428, 24 N.W.2d 836
(1946); Buhler v. Maddison, 109 Utah 267, 166 P.2d 205 (1946).
' Robertson, supra note 23, at 772.
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in line with the 1934 Restatement, maintained that although the forum
determines according to its own conflicts rule whether a given question is
substance or procedure, still it will examine the entire transaction includ-
ing the statute or other rule of law creating the obligation and its interpre-
tation by the courts of the foreign state.2" This appears to be the position
of the case at hand. Whether this approach squares with the new Proposed
Official Draft of the Second Restatement of Conflicts is doubtful. There,
generally, a flexible approach to characterization and to the laws which
will determine the issue is taken,"7 but it is specifically stated that in
determining whether a statute of the place bars the right or only the rem-
edy, the local law of the forum governs."
Dissimilarity and Proof of Foreign Law, Characterization. In Garza v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc." the plaintiff sought recovery for an injury which
occurred while travelling on a Mexican bus in Mexico on a leg of a tour
from San Antonio, Texas, to Monterrey, Mexico, and back which was all
arranged by defendant Greyhound Lines including provision for the
Mexican carrier. The plaintiff alleged that the place of injury and the
driver's negligence were both in Mexico somewhere between Nuevo Laredo,
Tamaulipas and Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. Nothing appears from the
reported case as to the proper law to be applied. The defendant, however,
alleged that the law of place of injury governed the obligations of the
parties and then entered a plea claiming that the trial court lacked juris-
diction over the cause of action because of the dissimilarity of the foreign
law (either that of the State of Tamaulipas, the State of Nuevo Leon or
the Republic of Mexico) to the law of Texas. The trial court sustained the
defendant's plea and dismissed the case. The plaintiff appealed, contending
that proper proof had not been made by the defendant of the foreign sub-
stantive law alleged to govern the case; hence, there was no evidence sup-
porting the finding of dissimilarity and, consequently, the trial court erred
in dismissing on this ground.
In the absence of pleading or proof of foreign law the Texas courts
presumed such law to be the same as that of Texas,"' and when foreign
law is presented, strict proof (i.e., an authenticated copy of a foreign
statute or decree) is required." In this case only a translation of provisions
of the Mexican code was used to prove Mexican law. Moreover, the provi-
sions set forth were applicable to Mexican federal matters and it was not
shown that they were pertinent to an injury in a Mexican state. Since
Mexican law was not properly proved, the court of civil appeals found
error in the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on ground of dis-
similarity. The opinion went on to conclude that since the court was
2 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 584, comment b (1934).
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 7 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. 1, 1967).
" Id. § 143, comment b.
2'418 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
"ol C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99, at 132 (2d ed. 1956).
" Id. at 189. See also Hunter v. West, 293 S.W.2d 686 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956).
[Vol. 23
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"officially ignorant of Mexican law,"32 it could not review the lower court's
ruling that the Mexican law was dissimilar. 3
Plaintiff had one further obstacle to overcome for, although article 4678
might grant a cause of action under foreign law, the plaintiff here had
not pleaded or proved a cause of action under the foreign law. However,
the decision points up the fact that there is more than one way to skin a
cat and permit recovery in conflict of laws cases, even when proceeding
under the rigid vested rights theory. Lack of proof of the foreign law
prevented its application here as the lex loci delicti. The court therefore
turned to an alternative plea of the plaintiff that he should recover from
defendant on the basis of breach of an implied contractual obligation to
carry him safely. Characterization of the matter as contract instead of tort
requires application of contract conflicts principles lex loci contractus.
Thus the court said, "under applicable choice-of-law rules, this portion
of his [plaintiff's] suit is governed by the laws of the State of Texas, the
place where the contract was made."3 Consequently, the trial court was
said to have erred in refusing to take jurisdiction, and its judgment was
reversed and the cause remanded.
By characterizing the carrier-passenger relationship as sounding in con-
tract rather than as in tort, the law governing contracts controls and the
court can thus evade the application of the traditional place-of-the-tort
rule. Even under the vested rights theory, which supposedly would produce
certainty and simplicity in the conflict of laws area based upon hard and
fast concepts of jurisdiction for torts, contracts, property, etc., choice of
law concepts were and are susceptible to manipulation and give the courts
the chance, as here, to choose between laws rather than jurisdictions."
II. FAMILY LAW
Divorce. The troublesome problem of recognition of extra-state divorce
and jurisdiction therefor took on new dimensions in Burleson v. Burleson."5
The Houston court of civil appeals gave effect to a Nevada decree of
divorce rendered upon a finding and recital that the spouse bringing the
suit for divorce, the wife, had been a bona fide resident of the state of
Nevada for the required six-week period prior to the filing of suit."
12418 S.W.2d at 597.
33 Thus, the court did not reach the point whether Texas would preclude enforcement of a cause
of action arising under the laws of another jurisdiction if the law there was dissimilar to Texas
law. Older cases did establish such a rule, some of them speaking in terms of substantial dissimilar-
ity as a ground for no recovery under the foreign law. De Ham v. Mexican Nat'l Ry., 86 Tex.
68, 23 S.W. 381 (1893); Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Richards, 68 Tex. 375, 4 S.W. 627 (1887). En-
actment of article 4678, which gives a right of action under foreign law when death or injury
of a citizen of Texas has been caused by wrongful act in the foreign country, was intended to
change this rule and permit recovery. TEx. REV.. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4678 (1952). Despite the
enactment, later cases have refused to permit recovery under Mexican law on the ground of sub-
stantial dissimilarity. El Paso & Juarez Traction Co. v. Carruty, 255 S.W. 159 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1923); Carter v. Tillery, 257 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953), error ref. n.r.e. See also
Stumberg, Conflict of Laws-Torts-Texas Decisions, 9 TEXAS L. REV. 21 (1930).
34418 S.W.2d at 598.
5 See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CoNFLIcTs LAW § 110, at 257-58, S 133 (students ed. 1968).
36419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See Note, Full Faith and Credit-Procedural Lini-
tation Bars Collateral Attack on jurisdiction, 22 Sw. L.J. 662 (1968).
" The Nevada statutes set forth this six-week residence requirement before suit is brought to
obtain a divorce in the state. NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.020 (1967).
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Although the husband had not appeared in the Nevada case, he had been
served with citation in Texas and was notified by letter of the divorce
immediately following its rendition.
In attacking the validity of this divorce in the Domestic Relations Court
of Harris County, the plaintiff-husband alleged that the wife had not been
a resident of Nevada for the requisite six-week period and that her plead-
ings and testimony to that effect in the Nevada case were false. The jury
found that she had not met the six-weeks residence requirement, and upon
this verdict the court declared the Nevada decree ineffective. This portion
of the trial court's judgment was reversed by the court of civil appeals on
the ground that rule 60 (b) of Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure prevents
attack upon a judgment of the courts of that state for the fraud, mis-
representation or other misconduct of an adverse party unless the attack
is made before the expiration of six months. Since more than six months
had elapsed, and since the husband had failed to appear after having been
given fair opportunity to do so by the notice mailed to him, the Nevada
decree could not have been adjudged void in Nevada. Inasmuch as the
decree was not subject to attack for fraud where rendered, the court con-
cluded it was not subject to attack in Texas on this ground.
Lost sight of in this case was a possible lack of jurisdiction because
domicile might have been wanting. The marital relationship has often
been referred to as a status having its situs as a res at the domicile. Matters
affecting this status such as its termination are to be maintained at its
situs, the domicile.3 Traditionally, it has been recognized that a divorce
granted in a state which is not the place of domicile of either spouse is not
entitled to full faith and credit."s On the other hand a valid divorce which
is entitled to full faith and credit in other states can be granted at the
common or matrimonial domicile of the parties or at the domicile of one
of the spouses if it was the last common domicile.' In 1942 the Supreme
Court of the United States in the first case of Williams v. North Carolina"
recognized that a divorce could be granted by a state in which the plaintiff
spouse was domiciled even though this state was never the matrimonial
domicile and the other spouse was not subject to the jurisdiction of the
state or before the court. Such ex parte divorce decrees at the domicile of
one of the spouses were considered to be valid and entitled to full faith and
credit by sister states. The second case of Williams v. North Carolina"
permitted domicile as a jurisdictional fact to be questioned de novo in a
collateral proceeding in a sister state and allowed recognition of the divorce
" For discussion of domicile as a basis of divorce jurisdiction, see H. GooDP, IC-I & E. SCOLES,
CONFLICT oi' LAWS 255-58 (4th ed. 1964); R. LEFLAR, Ti-ir LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 312-16
(1959); G. STUMBIERG, supra note 20, at 292-303.
" RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 72 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. II, 1968) de-
clares: "A state may not exercise jurisdiction to dissolve the Marriage of spouses if neither spouse
is domiciled in the state and neither has such other relationship to the state as would make it rea-
sonable for the state to dissolve the marriage."
"°Thompson v. Thompson, 226 U.S. 551 (1913); Atherton v. Atherton, 181 U.S. 155 (1901).
41 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
42325 U.S. 226 (1945).
[Vol. 23
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decree to be refused after a determination that domicile had not in fact
existed there. "
In the case at hand question was raised as to the wife's qualification as
a six-weeks' resident of Nevada. If such doubt existed it would be fair to
assume uncertainty as to her actual establishment of domicile in Nevada.
According to the second Williams case collateral inquiry should have been
permissible in Texas to determine whether the wife who secured the
ex parte divorce was domiciled in the state of divorce. Consequently, the
Texas trial court could have refused recognition of the divorce if the
fact of domicile of the wife had been attacked and if the court had found
domicile in Nevada to be non-existent.
If domicile is the sole basis of jurisdiction for divorce, it would follow
that a state where neither spouse is domiciled lacks jurisdiction to dissolve
the marriage. If in such an instance it does so, its judgment is constitution-
ally void as violative of the due process of laws clause of the fourteenth
amendment44 and is not entitled to full faith and credit. If the Nevada
judgment were void for lack of jurisdiction of that state, then it would
appear evident that Nevada could not prohibit attack on that judgment
because of intrinsic fraud by invoking a rule of procedure providing
against such attack after the expiration of six months. It is true that a
state can grant or deny relief from a valid judgment which is obtained
by fraud or misrepresentation, and another state, when called upon to
enforce such a judgment, should give such effect to it as would be given
by the court in which it was rendered. Thus, if relief for fraud is not
permitted in the decree-rendering state and the judgment is not subject to
attack there, it should not be subject to attack in a sister state." This rule,
however, presupposes a valid judgment as distinguished from a judgment
constitutionally void because of lack of jurisdiction of the state rendering
it. To apply the rule in the latter instance would prohibit the collateral
attack of the jurisdictional factor of domicile which is permitted in the
second Williams case. Foreclosure of attack by the state granting the judg-
ment would allow a void judgment to stand unchallenged, thus making
such void judgment effective.'
'3 The Supreme Court stated that "The fact that the Nevada Court found that they were
domiciled there is entitled to respect, and more. The burden of undermining the verity which
the Nevada decrees import rests heavily upon the assailant. But simply because the Nevada Court
found that it had power to award a divorce decree, cannot, we have seen, foreclose reexamination
by another State." Id. at 233-34.
44Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1953), took this position by stating: "Nevertheless,
if the jurisdiction for divorce continues to be based on domicile, as we think it does, we believe
it to be lack of due process for one state to take to itself the readjustment of domestic relations
between those domiciled elsewhere." Id. at 677. In Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226
(1945), Justice Frankfurter, in delivering the opinion of the Court, stated: "Under our system of
law, judicial power to grant a divorce-jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile."
Id. at 229.
The acquisition of the new domicile apparently depends upon the factors of physical presence at
the place plus an intention to make that place a "home for the time at least." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 18 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I, 1967).
4 See RESTATEMENT OF JUDGMENTS § 118 (1942); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
440 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 115 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I,
1967).
4 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals cited two Texas cases which do not seem to be precedent
for precluding attack if the judgment were void in that the state lacked jurisdiction. The first,
1969]
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However, it should be noted that there is state authority to the effect
that attack upon an ex parte divorce may be foreclosed. In Simons v. Miami
Beach First National Bank," the court barred collateral attack upon an
ex parte divorce on the ground of lack of necessary residence in Florida
by a spouse not subject to personal jurisdiction there because the spouse,
having due notice of the suit, could have contested the husband's allegations
of residence or domicile by defending the original suit. Again, in Colby v.
Colby," Nevada courts held that collateral attack would be precluded
in Nevada on a Nevada ex parte divorce by a spouse not personally subject
to the Nevada jurisdiction because perjury of the other spouse as to domi-
cile was intrinsic fraud to which attack would not be allowed after six
months from the entering of judgment. The Nevada court, however, was
of the definite belief that there was judicial power, i.e., jurisdiction of the
state, and relied heavily on Mr. Justice Murphy's concurring opinion in
the second Williams case wherein it was stated: "The State of Nevada
has unquestioned authority, consistent with procedural due process, to
grant divorces on whatever basis it sees fit to all who meet its statutory
requirements. It is entitled, moreover, to give its divorce decrees absolute
and binding finality within the confines of its borders. ' "'
Attention should be directed to another issue. Domicile may not be the
sole jurisdictional ground for divorce today. Some states have instituted
a reasonable residence requirement"0 and some like Nevada would authorize
a very short requirement. The Supreme Court of the United States has
not yet spoken as to additional bases for jurisdiction for the grant of a
valid divorce for purposes of full faith and credit or due process. Writers
sanction a reasonable period of residence as a basis which could possibly be
sustained by the Supreme Court, although a six-week period might not
seem reasonable. If such were to be sustainable as a basis of jurisdiction, 1
a divorce granted on such a period of residence would be a valid one, and
Marsh v. Millward, 381 S.W.2d 110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964), error ref. n.r.e., was concerned with
the enforcement of Colorado and Wyoming judgments in Texas. The court refused enforcement,
because the Rules of Procedure of the two states prohibited attack for fraud after a period of
time. Here, however, there was no question of personal jurisdiction over the defendant in the
Colorado and Wyoming suits for he was personally served in each state. Thus the judgments were
not void as violative of due process of law. The second case, O'Brien v. Lanpar Co., 399 S.W.2d
340 (Tex. 1966) involved the applicability of the Illinois long-arm statute for purposes of juris-
diction over an out-of-state Texas corporation. Here jurisdiction and due process under the mini-
mum contacts theory were present, for the contact with Illinois was said to be substantial.
47 157 So. 2d 199 (Fla. App. 1963).
4"78 Nev. 150, 369 P.2d 1019 (1962).
"325 U.S. 226, at 239. It should be noted, however, that in a previous case a Nevada court
stressed the fact that the elements of domicile (presence within the state accompanied by an in-
tent to remain in the state for an indefinite p riod of time) must coalesce within the six-week
period. Lamb v. Lamb, 57 Nev. 421, 65 P.2d 873 (1937).
" Texas, for example, deems servicemen stationed within the state for a continuous period of
twelve months to be actual and bona fide inhabitants and residents of Texas for purposes of di-
vorce. T.x. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4631 (1960). This was upheld in Wood v. Wood, 159
Tex. 350, 320 S.W.2d 807 (1959). See Comment, The Servicemen's Dilemma: Divorce Without
Domicil, 13 Sw. L.J. 233 (1959). For discussion of a reasonable period of residence for purposes
of divorce jurisdiction, see H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 38, at 256; R. LEFLAR, supra
note 35, at 315-16.
" The most recent utterance of the Restatement recognizes no jurisdiction to dissolve the mar-
riage if neither spouse is domiciled in the state unless a relationship of a party to the state makes
it reasonable for the state to grant the divorce. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 72 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. 1, 1967).
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preclusion by a state of attack for fraud on such a valid decree would be
warranted. Since the judgment with a constitutional jurisdictional basis
would not be subject to attack where rendered, it should not be subject
to attack in other states.
Support. Way v. Fisher" reminds that there are many pitfalls in effectuat-
ing interstate support for dependents despite the existence of the Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Acts in the states involved. 3 Here
petition was filed under the Uniform Support of Dependents Law of the
state of Iowa in a court of that state praying for an order to be directed
to a resident of Texas for the support of six minor children. This petition
from the initiating state was forwarded to the district clerk of Harris
County, Texas; citation was had on defendant who, through his attor-
ney, filed his answer in the form of a general denial. The defendant
appeared at the hearing through his attorney. The court ordered defendant
to pay support in the sum of $3 0 per month. On appeal the court of civil
appeals found that there was no evidence to support the trial court's
judgment and therefore the trial court's judgment could not stand, even
though objection to this lack of evidence had not been made before the
trial court.
Consideration was given as to whether statements made in the certificate
and other papers forwarded from the initiating state could serve as evi-
dence. A negative conclusion was reached, the court citing a former case
wherein it was stated: "The statements made in the certificate, based upon
the plaintiff's petition, and without notice to the defendant, are not to be
considered by the court of the responding state as evidence of the facts
alleged in the plaintiff's petition." '54 Such a conclusion appears correct in
view of the fact that the defendant is not before the court or subject to
the jurisdiction of the initiating state, and, as it has been pointed out, the
initiating state is only called upon to consider facts to determine whether
a duty of support probably exists. If the initiating court finds a probable
duty of support, it is called upon to send the verifying petition and cer-
tificate to the responding state which, after proper service of process upon
the defendant, is made responsible to determine whether the duty of sup-
port does exist and to make the appropriate order.55
Custody. Spitziniller v. Spitzmiller" involves the problem of recognition
in Texas of a New York decree awarding custody of children to the
father. Although the parties, husband and wife, had long been residents
and domiciliaries of New York, the wife and mother of the children after
separation from the husband, father of the children, had, without notify-
52425 S.W.2d 704 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
" The Texas Act is TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2328b-4 (Supp. 1968).
" Neff v. Johnson, 391 S.W.2d 760, 764 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also Schlang v. Schlang,
415 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
" Neff v. Johnson, 391 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965). See also Brockelbank, Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 5 ARK. L. REV. 349 (1951); Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768,
781 (1955).
56429 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968), error ref. n.r.e.
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ing her husband, come to Texas with the children. Thereafter, the husband
brought a separation-custody suit in a New York court. The wife had
notice of the suit and an attorney was present as an observer. She, however,
made no personal appearance. Judgment was rendered in default. Husband,
in a habeas corpus proceeding in a Texas court challenged the detention of
the children by the mother and sought their custody on the basis of the
New York judgment which he claimed was entitled to full faith and
credit. 7
The trial court noted that evidence was present to support the New
York court's finding that the wife was a domiciliary of New York at the
time of the custody suit and that the proper forum for the award of cus-
tody of children was the place of residence and domicile. Finding further
that the New York decree was res judicata at the time it was rendered
and that there had been no substantial change of conditions established
since, the trial court without a jury held that the New York judgment
was a subsisting, valid and final judgment. Therefore, a writ of habeas
corpus was granted awarding custody of the children to the father.
The wife in a cross action to the habeas corpus proceeding had asserted
that the New York judgment was not based on jurisdiction; hence, it
was void. It was her contention that she and the children were domiciled
in Texas at the date of the New York suit and at the date of service and
that the trial court should have made its own independent determination
to this effect instead of relying on the finding of domicile of the New York
court. On appeal her point was sustained. The court of civil appeals
declared:
The Texas court is obliged by Article IV, Section 1, of the Constitution of
the United States . . . to give full faith and credit to the New York decree,
provided the New York court had jurisdiction over appellant in personam ....
It is well established that appellant had the right to impeach that decree
collaterally in another state by proof that the court which entered the decree
had no jurisdiction. 8
Finding that sufficient evidence existed in the Texas record to raise a fact
question as to the place of wife's domicile (New York or Texas) and that
wife had not been given opportunity in the trial court to make independent
findings as to her domicile, the court of civil appeals refused to grant full
faith and credit to the New York judgment, reversed the trial court and
remanded for a new trial.
The law has long been in an unsatisfactory state of confusion concerning
the proper jurisdictional basis for the grant of a custody award and the
recognition which is to be given to such an award in another state. Tradi-
tionally the view has been that the only state having jurisdiction to
issue a valid custody award was the state of the child's domicile." A more
recent position, however, has not been so restrictive in its viewpoint, and
has set forth three bases of jurisdiction. The first would find the child's
" The New York custody order granted custody to the mother, provided she returned with
the children to New York, otherwise to the father. She failed to obey the order. Id. at 558.
58 id. at 560.
5 9 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 117, 145-46 (1934).
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domicile to be a jurisdictional basis viewing the problem as one relating
to status. The second would look to jurisdiction over the parents of the
child, and the third, viewing the matter as one to be controlled by con-
siderations of the child's best interests, would place jurisdiction in the
state where the child was present since that state was best qualified to
make such a determination."0
Although the Supreme Court of the United States has not laid down
definite standards for the recognition of a custody decree, it is usually
accepted that such a decree is subject to full faith and credit to some
extent, but only as to the facts existing at the time the decree is granted"s
and not as to changed conditions occurring after the granting of the
decree."2 But even as to recognition of the decree as to all matters up to
the time of its rendition, the decree must have some jurisdictional basis
and in the case at hand, since the mother and children were not present
within the state at the time of suit, the state of New York could not have
possessed jurisdiction under any of the three bases of jurisdiction men-
tioned above unless the children remained domiciled in New York in
which case basis number one would be present, or unless the mother
remained domiciled within the state which would accord with number
two. But even had the children remained subject to New York jurisdiction
because of domicile or even presence so that jurisdictional factors for the
award of domicile might have been present in that state, the Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a parent cannot be deprived of his
or her rights as to custody of children by a court not having jurisdiction
over that parent." The court, being of the opinion that the parent-child
relationship involved personal rights and duties, stated "that a mother's
rights to custody of her children is a personal right entitled to at least
as much protection as her rights to alimony."' In the Spitzmiller case if
the mother was not still domiciled in the state of New York, no basis for
in personam jurisdiction would appear to be present. Domicile becomes
the prime jurisdictional factor, which can, according to various United
States Supreme Court cases such as Williams v. North Carolina,"' be sub-
jected to collateral attack in a habeas corpus proceeding such as this and
which will warrant a refusal of full faith and credit of the custody decree
if it is proved that no jurisdiction existed in the state rendering the decree.
Although the facts were not such as to present a question as to recogni-
tion of a sister state judgment, the problems of jurisdiction and child
custody decrees were also before the court in the case of Staples v. Staples."0
The court had before it an order of the Domestic Relations Court of Taylor
" See, e.g., Justice Traynor's opinion in Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d
739, 741-51 (1948). See also A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 282 (1962); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I, 1967).
" See R. LEFLAR, supra note 35, at 348; G. STUMBERG, supra note 20, at 322.
02Kovacs v. Brewer, 356 U.S. 604 (1958); Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
" May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). The court held that full faith and credit was not
required where the mother was "neither domiciled, resident nor present" within the state. Id. at
533.
'lId. at 534.
65325 U.S. 226 (1945).
00423 S.W.2d 166 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
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County modifying the provisions of a previous divorce judgment fixing
the visitation rights of the father to his children to the extent of giving
him additional visitation rights. At the time of the divorce proceeding
no question of jurisdiction presented itself, for the parties were domiciliaries
of Texas and personally appeared before the court. Thereafter, the mother
took the children to Alabama, and at the time of the modification she and
the children were located there. She had been served with process, how-
ever, and, in response to this notice and citation, appeared and testified in
a hearing concerning the father's visitation rights. She did not attack the
jurisdiction at this time, but subsequently filed an amended motion to
set aside the order changing the visitation rights on the ground that the
court had no jurisdiction to alter the first custody decree for she and the
children were residents of Alabama and not before the court. The court
of civil appeals disagreed, finding that the record did not conclusively
show a domicile change to Alabama, but went on to hold in any event
that a change and increase in visitation rights did not alter the custody
provisions. This would imply that the court distinguished jurisdiction for
the alteration of a custody decree (which may or may not have been
present at the time of modification) from jurisdiction for the change in
visitation rights which the court said existed."
Under modern notions of custody jurisdiction, it would seem that
differentiation between custody and visitation jurisdictional requirements
is somewhat pointless, for child custody jurisdiction is now said to exist
in a state if the child is domiciled or present within that state, or when the
parties claiming custody are personally subject to the jurisdiction of the
state. Jurisdiction would be present here on the last basis, i.e., personal
jurisdiction over the father and mother, even though the children may be
domiciled in Alabama and are physically present there rather than in
Texas. Thus, even if custody was affected by the change in visitation
rights, the Texas court having in personam jurisdiction over the father
and mother could change the former custody decree in the light of
changed circumstances.
The court's distinction between visitation and custody, however, may
be warranted in the light of previous Texas cases as to jurisdiction to award
custody. Texas courts have stressed two alternative prerequisites of child
71d. at 169:
We conclude that the order here appealed from modified visitation rights, not cus-
tody, and that under the circumstances mentioned said court had jurisdiction to
render the judgment as modifying his visitation rights and, since we have no record
of the proceedings that were the basis of said modification order, in support of
that judgment, we presume there was sufficient evidence of a change in conditions
to support it.
The court in making a distinction between visitation rights and custody was following the pre-
vious Supreme Court of Texas case, Leithold v. Plass, 413 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. 1967), which dis-
tinguished the two, holding that a modification of visitation rights did not affect a previous award
of custody. The court in Leithold stated:
Custody of a child connotes the right to establish the child's domicile and includes
the elements of immediate and direct care and control of the child, together with
provision for its needs . . . . These rights inherent in a custody status are not held
by one enjoying visitation rights as provided in the custody decree.
Id. at 700. The Leithold case, however, involved no jurisdictional problem.
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 79 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. 1, 1967).
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custody jurisdiction: the domicile of the child within the state or physical
presence of the child within the state. " If these are the only bases of juris-
diction under Texas law, and if the children happened to be domiciled
in Alabama (which is not conclusively shown) and not present in Texas,
then the Texas court would have possessed no jurisdiction for a change of
custody despite the fact that the contending parents were both before the
court. In such case a change in visitation rights would have to be distin-
guished from a change of custody to determine whether the in personam
jurisdiction which does exist is sufficient for the hearing of the action.
The court did not mention the basis of jurisdiction for the change in
the visitation rights. It can be assumed that it was based on personal juris-
diction over the mother by reason of her appearance before the court
modifying the decree after service of process and notification,7 0 or on the
basis of continuing jurisdiction from that acquired over her in the original
divorce-custody proceeding which continues as to all necessary concomi-
tants of the original cause until final determination.'
III. JURISDICTION IN PERSONAM
Carter v. G & L Tool Co."2 involves an application of the well-settled
rule that a general appearance by a defendant in a case either in person or
through an authorized attorney subjects a defendant to the judicial juris-
diction of the state. Thus, if an action is commenced in a state where the
defendant is not present, domiciled or otherwise subject to the jurisdiction,
but the defendant thereafter makes a general appearance in the case, he is
before the court and is bound by the judgment. 73 Here the plaintiff filed
suit against defendants Carters (who were personally served) and other
party defendants. One of these defendants filed a cross-claim against
defendants Carters. The Carters were represented by an authorized attor-
ney in Colorado who appeared in the suit on their behalf filing an answer
to the plaintiff's complaint and requesting a continuance for time to file
an answer to the cross-claim. Thereafter the plaintiff's suit was dismissed,
but on the understanding that such dismissal did not affect or prejudice
the rights of the defendant who was prosecuting the cross-claim. Judgment
was rendered against the Carters on the cross-claim. This judgment was
then sought to be enforced against them in Texas. The Carters contended
that such judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit or enforce-
ment in Texas because they were never served personally with the answer
and cross-claim of the defendant pressing such, and further that the sum
"
9 Worden v. Worden, 148 Tex. 356, 224 S.W.2d 187 (1949); Lanning v. Gregory, 100 Tex.
310, 99 S.W. 542 (1907); DeLaughter v. DeLaughter, 370 S.W.2d 207 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963),
error ref. n.r.e. See also Note, Parent and Child-Residence of the Child in Determining Child
Custody Jurisdiction, 1 BAYLOR L. REV. 94 (1948).
0 For bases of jurisdiction in personam see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
27 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I, 1967).
" Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). For discussion as to custody awards,
see A. EHRENZWEIG, supra note 60, at 90-92; R. LEFLAR, supra note 35, at 51-52.
72428 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
" See general texts on conflict of laws such as H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 38, at
121; G. STUMBERG, supra note 20, at 80. And see RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 82
(1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws 5 33 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I, 1967).
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rendered by the cross-claim judgment was in excess of that demanded and
hence a violation of Colorado law.
As to the first contention the trial court and the court of civil appeals
held in accord with the above-mentioned general rule. Finding that the
filing of an answer by a non-resident is by Colorado law a general appear-
ance, and further that a defendant who appears and asks for an extension
of time also is believed to have appeared generally despite lack of notice,
the court found jurisdiction over the Carters. The court also stated that
when a defendant files his answer to the petition of plaintiff so as to consti-
tute a general appearance, "such appearance brings him before the court
for all purposes and charges him with notice of the cross-claim, whether
it be filed before or after his appearance in an answer to plaintiff's
demand."7
The latter contention to the effect that judgment was not entitled to
full faith and credit because the Colorado court committed an error of law
has no merit. It is well settled that an error of law or fact in the proceed-
ings does not affect the validity of the judgment so as to permit collateral
attack thereon as a denial of full faith and credit.75
IV. TAXATION
Enforcement of Sister-State Tax Claim. The decision in Hamm v. Berreyt"
is in line with the traditional and orthodox rule that a state will not enforce
tax claims arising under the revenue laws of another state" either because
such claims are considered to be penal in nature or because of the belief
that obligation to pay taxes does not give rise to a personal liability or
debt by the taxpayer. " The United States Supreme Court has, however,
held in Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co." that a tax judgment of a
sister-state is not to be denied full faith and credit simply because it is one
for taxes. Constitutionally speaking, the enforcement of a claim for taxes
unreduced to judgment is still open. In the Hamm case the Texas court
had before it an assessment for income taxes made by the Alabama com-
missioner of revenue against a Texas domiciliary based on the sale of
certain interests in Alabama lands. The Alabama authorities claimed that
a final assessment by the Alabama Department of Revenue from which no
appeal had been taken by the taxpayer was conclusive as a final judgment
in Alabama, and, as a final judgment of a sister-state it was constitutionally
74428 S.W.2d at 681.
7 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947). See also RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
431 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS S 106 (Prop. Off. Draft, Pt. I,
1967).
7419 S.W.2d 401 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967), error ref. n.r.e.
7 Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929); Holman v. Johnson, I Cowp. 341, 343,
98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 610 (1934).
The rule has been subjected to criticism and some courts have seen fit in more recent times to
give effect to revenue laws of other states and tax claims arising thereunder. See, e.g., Oklahoma
Tax Comm'n v. Rodgers, 238 Mo. App. 1115, 193 S.W.2d 919 (1946). See also H. GOODRICH &
E. SCOLES, supra note 38, at 99-100; R. LEFLAR, supra note 35, at 641-43.
" Colorado v. Harbeck, 232 N.Y. 71, 133 N.E. 357 (1921); Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement
of Penal and Governmental Claims, 46 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1932).
79296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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entitled to full faith and credit in Texas. Although the Alabama commis-
sioner cited and set forth certain Alabama cases and laws to sustain his
contention, still he did not plead nor prove such Alabama laws nor did he
avail himself of rule 184a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure by request-
ing the trial judge, in accord with the rule, to take judicial notice of the
law or court decisions of a sister-state. In failing to invoke rule 184a and
in failing to prove Alabama law, the court presumed the law of the other
state, Alabama, to be the same as that of Texas."0 The court, therefore,
concluded that this assessment was not a judgment of Alabama subject to
full faith and credit, but a mere tax claim which need not under the general
rule be enforced in Texas.
It is interesting to note that the Texas statute on Texas tax comity was
brought into the case, as well as an Alabama law regarding the enforce-
ment there of liability for taxes imposed by other states. The Texas law
requires recognition of other states' sales and use taxes if other states
extend a like comity to Texas taxes.8' The tax claim here was based on
income tax. The Texas statute was inapplicable. Moreover, the Alabama
comity provision was not a subject for consideration, for it was not proved
nor was rule 184a invoked. Consequently, the Alabama comity statute
could not be relied on for it was not available to the trial court.
Jurisdiction To Tax. Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization"a pre-
sents a rather curious and interesting anomaly regarding jurisdiction for
the taxation of tangible property and the differing rules that can be applied
as to jurisdiction in the interstate or conflicts sense and jurisdiction in the
local or state sense. Here the city of Fort Worth and the Fort Worth Inde-
pendent School District imposed an apportioned ad valorem tax on the
rolling stock, the buses, of the Greyhound Lines, a California corporation,
such rolling stock being regularly engaged in travel in Texas and in the
use of Texas highways in interstate commerce operations. The old rule
mobilia sequuntur personam would permit tangible chattels to be taxed at
the domicile of the owner." However, this legal fiction has been subjected
to modern change and supplantation by the situs rule. For example, the
state of owner's domicile may not tax the chattel if it has acquired a per-
manent situs in another state. 4 In such a case the state of the situs may levy
the tax. However, the domicile rule remains if the chattel has not obtained
a permanent situs elsewhere. Thus, the problem of tax jurisdiction arises
where the tangible personalty has not acquired a permanent situs elsewhere,
but has a fairly continuous location in another state through use therein.
In such an instance the state of domicile retains taxing jurisdiction, but
the property is also taxable in the other state where a certain situs through
8"For discussion of proving foreign law and rule 184a, see 1 C. MCCORMICK & R. RAY, TEXAS
LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99, 173 (2d ed. 1956).
8 TEX. TAX-GEN. ANN. art. 20.17 (1960).
82419 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. 1967).
" On the mobilia maxim see G. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 430-35 (4th ed.
1952). And as to tax jurisdiction see H. GOODRICH & E. SCOLES, supra note 38, at 66.
84 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194 (1905).
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location or use for an appreciable period of time has come about." To
prevent multiple taxation by two or more states the tax must be appor-
tioned or divided to take into account the contacts of the various states8
°
In the case at hand Texas was not the place of owner's domicile. Thus
the jurisdiction for the tax was based on a situs which was not permanent
but one based on continual use within the state. Such contact, held the
Supreme Court of Texas, would establish a sufficient degree of permanency
as distinguished from a mere temporary or transitory situation so as to
fix a tax situs which would avoid constitutional inhibitions such as burden-
ing interstate commerce or violating due process of law.87
Turning from jurisdiction of the state to the jurisdiction of the city of
Fort Worth and the school district, the court applied the mobilia rule.
It could not say, however, that domicile of the corporation was in Texas
or Fort Worth, inasmuch as Greyhound was incorporated and therefore
domiciled in California. But the court reasoned that in a purely intrastate or
local relationship the equivalent of domicile of a corporation would be the
home office or principal place of business within the state. In Texas the
principal place of business of Greyhound was in Fort Worth. Fort Worth
as the place of owner's principal office or place of business had jurisdiction
to levy the tax. Thus the local taxing situs in Texas, in the absence of
contrary legislative provision, was Fort Worth.
85 See Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959); Braniff
Airways, Inc. v. Nebraska State Bd., 347 U.S. 590 (1954); Ott v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line
Co., 336 U.S. 169 (1949).
" Central R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 370 U.S. 607 (1962). This case would permit the domiciliary
state to tax to the full value of the property, without apportionment unless the same property
may be taxed elsewhere. The burden is placed on the taxpayer to show this.
87419 S.W.2d at 349: "[T]he Supreme Court of the United States has held in a long line of
decisions that the legal requirement of permanency of situation and therefore tax situs of
such units apart from the state of legal domicile, is established by continual use, regular or irregu-
lar . . . in a non-domiciliary state."
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